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Can added value be obtained from better collaboration between oil companies and contractors? 
The topic is addressed by analysing organisational patterns, contracts and compensation formats.  
Specific issues raised in this paper include the following questions. Are adjustments needed to 
contractual terms and tendering processes? Do contractors have sufficiently strong incentives to 
exploit the opportunities for service provision offered by existing technology? Do they have 
sufficient incentives within the framework of existing and future contracts to develop new 
technological solutions? Do the tender criteria pick up technological and organisational 
improvements? Do requirements for transparency and auditability prompt decision-takers to 
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In the oil White Paper presented in 2003 (Report no 38 to the Storting 2003-2004), the 
Norwegian government expressed a desired to realise the added value which could be obtained 
from better collaboration between oil companies and contractors, not least by changing and 
improving the way the division of work was organised offshore and on land. So what has 
happened? Many improvements have been made and many routines revised. But a number of 
obstacles have also emerged on the way to realising the full collaborative potential – partly 
internal organisational factors in the company, partly negotiations and contractual relations 
between employers and employees, and partly coordination problems between oil and contractor 
companies. This article discusses some of these challenges. 
 
Drilling operations are used a case throughout the article, and I draw here on a project in which I 
collaborated with the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD). This work provided good access 
to empirical material. I gained access to rig and oil service contracts, and we had a series of 
meetings with key players in oil and service companies. We also had one meeting with the 
Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF). In addition, I have surveyed relevant academic 
literature and best practice studies. Since the major oil companies and oil service companies are 
present in Norway, and since most elements of the contracts and work procedures in the industry 
follow an international standard, many of the findings reported in the paper are relevant to other 
petroleum extraction countries. 
 
Specific issues raised in this article include the following questions. Are adjustments needed to 
contractual terms and tendering processes? Do contractors have sufficiently strong incentives to 
exploit the opportunities for service provision offered by existing technology? Do they have 
sufficient incentives within the framework of existing and future contracts to develop new 
technological solutions? To answer these questions, the financial incentives available to 
contractors have been studied. These have proved to be relatively complex, since one must look not only at existing deals but also at the implicit incentives in the evaluation criteria used by the 
oil companies when awarding new contracts. In other words, the question is how these will affect 
the focus on contractors overall. This article also discusses various forms of collaboration 
between oil and contractor companies – how best to involve contractors in developing solutions 
and services. I start by reviewing the basic structure of oil service and rig contracts. 
 
 
2. How contracts are designed in the oil service sector 
 
As a result of declining efficiency and a strong growth in costs for drilling, a number of 
innovations have emerged in the organisation and designing of contracts for oil services. A larger 
element of multi-delivery agreements can be seen, and new incentive systems have been tried. 
 
The general reward format for oil services is payment per metre drilled when operational, and 
otherwise a standby rate. This differs from rig charters, which are largely based on day rates (see 
part 3). A possible reason for the difference is that drilling involves fairly significant variable 
costs (wear and tear), making activity-based payment more relevant. Drilling contractors also 
have more direct influence on the drilling tempo – to be effective incentives must be made 
contingent on outcomes within the control sphere of the supplier. Payments are withheld 
(punishment, negative incentive) should the contractor suffer downtime faults. A typical well 
takes about 40 days to drill – in other words, it involves three-four offshore tours. For a more 
detailed description, see Osmundsen et al. (2010). 
 
The former Norwegian oil company Hydro introduced the performance adjusted price system 
(Paps) some years ago as an incentive for oil services. The new element in these contracts is that 
penalties are supplemented by rewards for good performance, and that penalty/reward are based 
not on the whole well but on well sections. Benchmarks for drilling efficiency are set for each 
section through a dialogue between oil and service company. By meeting these benchmarks, the 
contractor can obtain a substantial additional reward. The upside is higher than the downside 
(asymmetry), but both have a limit. In other words, this is a target-sum contract – more 
specifically a section-based, asymmetrical and piece-by-piece linear payment per metre drilled, with a floor on the downside and a cap on the upside. General benchmarks are revised annually, 
with ever more ambitious goals being set. If formation or operating conditions differ from the 
assumptions, benchmarks can be amended along the way. This must be agreed in writing 
between the land organisations before starting on the relevant well section. 
 
3. Rig charters 
 
The compensation format for rig charters was earlier based on payment per metre drilled. 
Today’s industry standard is day rates, which are differentiated by operating status:  
  
–  operating rates 
–  stand-by rates 
–  mobilisation rates. 
 
If the rig contractor cannot provide a unit which satisfies the technical requirements at the agreed 
date, a zero rate apples. The contractor may lose USD 400 000 per day, for instance, which 
offers a strong incentive to secure uptime. The charter also normally allows the oil company to 
cancel if start-up is delayed by a specified number of days. Rig contractors with a limited 
portfolio accordingly carry a substantial risk in relation to downtime. On the other hand, the rig 
contractor is also best placed to affect operating status. However, the consequential costs of 
delayed drilling – which can be very substantial – are not passed on to the rig contractor. 
 
The contracts often represent only a downside to the rig contractors, since the upside is valued 
very highly and that related to drilling speed, discovery and production is retained in its entirety 
by the oil company. Incentive contracts are relatively difficult to structure, since both sides have 
incomplete information. Furthermore, planning and determination of the well path rests with the 
oil company and are not available when a bid based on day rates is made. 
 
Perhaps the most important reasons why charter rates are not linked to metres drilled it that these 
lie largely outside the rig contractor’s control. First, a large number of service companies affect 
the progress of drilling operations. Second, the oil company normally retains the right to adjust the drilling programme by changing wells, well depths and so forth. For further details, see Corts 
(2000), Corts and Singh (2004), and Osmundsen et al (2008). 
 
The following discussion builds on general contract and incentive theory. Good overviews are 
provided by Bolton and Dewatripoint (2005), Salanié (1998), Hillier (1997), Hart (1995), Laffont 
and Tirole (1993) and Milgrom and Roberts (1992). I also build on personal research applying 
incentive theory to the petroleum sector. See Osmundsen (2006), for example, and Olsen and 
Osmundsen (2005). 
 
4. Incentive structure – a more integrated approach 
 
Incentives are often treated in discussions of compensation formats as synonymous with various 
types of bonus systems. That is far too narrow. The financial incentive structure for a rig 
contractor or oil service company includes the following considerations: 
 
(1) evaluation criteria for the award of drilling assignments 
(2) the compensation format and incentives in the applicable contract 
(3) remuneration in the next contract. 
 
Management attention at rig contractors is focused on securing employment for the units. 
Evaluation criteria for awarding such assignments accordingly function as an implicit incentive.  
Since historical figures for uptime (the proportion of time when the contractor can provide a 
well-functioning rig) and drilling efficiency are used when awarding charters, these parameters 
set strong implicit incentives even if the latter are not explicitly included in the compensation 
format for the rig charter. Furthermore, the compensation agreed for the next contract will 
represent incentives driving the rig contractor and oil service company towards a high pace 
(higher rates in the next contract) or a low pace (lower rate or unemployment when the contract 
expires). I will now look more closely at evaluation criteria used when awarding drilling 
contracts. 
 
4.1 Evaluation criteria for bids  
Typical evaluation criteria for hiring drilling services – in no particular order – include:  
 
–  expertise 
–  financial strength 
–  day rates 
–  ability to finish on time 
–  compliance with regulations on the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS) 
–  operational efficiency and achievements 
–  health, safety and environment (HSE) system and culture 
–  high pressure and temperature (HPHT) expertise and experience.  
 
These evaluation criteria establish implicit incentives for the contractors. Price (day rates) can be 
seen to be only one of many evaluation parameters. The oil business is perhaps the leading 
example of an industry where choosing the lowest price does not necessarily represent the best 
economic solution. Lifetime costs are what count, and the income side must always be taken into 
account.  
 
5. Technology development – differing goals 
 
The oil companies and their contractors may have rather different objectives with technology 
development. The ideal position for a contractor is to develop technology in close cooperation 
with an oil company. That secures both user relevance and financing. The contractor will also 
often want to be responsible for both development and implementation phases. Apart from 
providing employment, this gives control over the product developed. Furthermore, the 
contractor will want a long-term contractual relationship with the oil company which has 
financed the development, as well as exclusive rights to the end product. The last of these 
includes no restrictions on sales to other oil companies, while the oil company which contributed 
to the research must pay the full price to secure the hardware, processes or services developed. 
 Close relations with different contractors is the ideal position for the oil company. That permits 
tailoring to its specific operating conditions. The oil company does not want to be bound in any 
way – after the development phase, for instance, it wants to have a free choice of contractor and 
technical solution. The oil company wants user rights to the developed product, and does not 
want to “pay twice” for the same thing. If possible, it also wants exclusive rights – in other 
words, the ability to commercialise possible newly developed products or services itself. A 
stronger focus on technology as a separate business area can be seen in the oil companies. 
 
 
5.1 Technology development – negotiating solutions and contract incentives 
 
As explained above, the ideal position for contractor and oil company do not entirely coincide. 
As in other contexts, there are conflicts of interest as well as shared interests. The latter involve 
creating a product or service which adds value. The conflict involves which side will reap the 
financial benefits of this added value, and which is to have ownership and user rights. Ownership 
and reaping value added are in turn closely related. The outcome is normally a negotiated 
solution somewhere between the ideal position of both sides, where their relative bargaining 
power determines who does best. Bargaining power is determined by the availability of credible 
alternatives. The contractor, for instance, could do well if it possesses a unique technology and 
expertise, and if it can and wants to part-finance the project itself. Unique expertise and 
financing opportunities strengthen the contractor’s bargaining power, and allow it to retain more 
of the upside. 
 
Sooner or later, technological innovations will benefit the whole industry. Knowledge has the 
character of a common good. The latter can easily be affected by undersupply. From the 
perspective of the industry – and society – the following questions can therefore be asked:  
 
  could the chosen solution fall short of the optimum socio-economic outcome? 
o  could a lack of bargaining power at certain contractors yield contractual solutions 
where the incentives for technology development are too weak? 
  does the contractor have incentives to exploit the potential in existing technology?  
One consideration in this context is that the incentives implicit in a tendering context may be too 
narrow. Could the measurability problem associated with technology-related quality mean that 
price becomes the most important criterion in practice? Do the tender criteria pick up 
technological and organisational improvements? Today’s requirements for transparency and 
auditability are sound principles. But one must be aware that they could prompt decision-takers 
to hesitate to select contractors with superior technology because that can be difficult to verify in 
a tendering process. The safest course for the bid evaluator could be to select known alternatives 
at a low price. That does not advance the industry. 
 
6. Challenges and obstacles in existing KPIs 
 
Another set of issues is presented by key performance indicators (KPIs) and internal evaluation 
criteria used in managing the oil industry. Effective company management requires individual 
activities to be split up and operationalised – as individual projects, for instance. These are then 
managed and evaluated against specific project-defined targets – KPIs. The advantage of this 
type of division is that each department and project knows what it has to do and what it will be 
measured by. The challenge is always to find good KPIs. Clearly measureable criteria such as 
volume, production cost and time could clash with quality, lifetime costs and flexibility. Taking 
account of these additional dimensions is important. 
 
In addition comes a clear threat of sub-optimisation. Since the measurement system normally 
only picks up benefits and costs for the individual project, people at the project level will not 
necessarily take account of costs incurred in other departments or at other times (involving 
maintenance, upgrading and removal, for example). Nor will they internalise benefits incurred by 
other departments or projects. The latter is particularly relevant for technological advances. In 
other words, undersupply of technological innovation is a problem not only at the level of society 
(between different companies) but also within a company – and its relevance is particularly high 
in large companies. The company’s internal management and reward system may penalise 
departments or projects for all costs incurred for R&D, including those related to pilots, but fail to ascribe to it the benefits of the innovation to other departments or projects. This could mean 
that insufficient research is pursued not only for society but also for the company. 
 
Take a specific example in the drilling sector. A drilling manager in an oil company is asked to 
accommodate a pilot project on their field. This could potentially enhance drilling productivity, 
increase drilling opportunities, and improve the company’s overall drilling portfolio. But the 
drilling manager’s own field is the only one included in their KPIs. Bearing full responsibility for 
downsides such as downtime during the test period, the manager is accordingly inclined to turn 
down a request for a pilot. KPIs can accordingly contribute to sub-optimisation. To realise this 
type of research project, it is thereby important that KPIs are adjusted for the field(s) concerned. 
 
7. Technology development or improved modes of working within the framework of 
existing contractor contracts 
 
Since oil services are often delivered under long-term contracts, such as five years with two 
options for the oil company to extend by three years, it is appropriate to look at contractor 
incentives to develop technology within the framework of the specific contract. This is also a 
relevant focus because oil companies are normally best able to finance research and can 
moreover define clear research needs. Do contractors have incentives to improve services within 
the framework of an existing contract, or to deliver a better project than the hours for which they 
are paid? Relevant examples are new technology which can reduce the time used, cut downtime 
or boost earnings. 
 
The answer is often no. On the contrary, delivery of the best solution could be disadvantageous 
for the contractor since it may then need fewer employees. And if it proposes measures which 
involve transferring personnel from offshore to land, fewer employees receive the offshore 
supplement. And employees face greater uncertainty over the location of their workplace. Within 
the framework, it is questionable whether the incentives to improve deliveries are strong enough 
to outweigh the disadvantages. On the other hand, developing better solutions may increase the 
contractor’s opportunities to win new contracts.  But no guarantee normally exists for contractors 
who make a commitment to technology development. Implicit promises of awarding a further job to the same contractor for good performance are not necessarily to be trusted. The oil 
companies usually want to retain competition over deliveries, and to avoid being locked in. 
Practical and institutional obstacles also hamper long contracts. If the same contractor is awarded 
contracts time and again, other companies will complain and the number of bids eventually 
decline. Since petroleum developments involve a government licence, the oil companies are also 
subject to the competition rules in the European Economic Area, which set clear limits on 
creating permanent “house” contractors. However, some companies provide incentives to amend 
the division of labour between land and offshore by meeting the training costs required for such 
changes and by retaining the offshore rate for employees transferred ashore. 
 
Do contracts based on hourly rates provide contractors with optimum incentives? Personnel costs 
are often incorporated in the day rate. Specific staffing is defined in the contract, and hourly rates 
are specified for land and offshore personnel. Fewer people offshore calls for a greater degree of 
multidisciplinary working by remaining employees. That calls for training, and the question of 
whether oil company or contractor should bear the cost is a relevant one. And if the oil 
companies are to bear all or part of the training costs, the question arises of whether these should 
be paid directly (earmarked) or incorporated in the rates (as part of a general payment). In 
principle, these approaches should be equivalent to each other. In practice, however, contractors 
do not appear to see it that way. They prefer training costs to be paid directly. A possible reason 
may be that incorporating them in the rates means they can be competed away. 
 
 
8. Improved collaboration between land and offshore 
 
A core question in organising interfaces between land and offshore in the oil industry is where 
operations personnel should be located on land – at the contractor or the oil company? A mix of 
solutions is seen in practice, but the balance varies from one oil company to another. One answer 
is for contractor personnel to be located at the operator’s premises during the day and at their 
own centre the rest of the time, with a number of base personnel permanently located at the 
contractor (partial decentralisation). Another is to concentrate a number of functions at the contractor (full decentralisation). As with many other organisational issues, various factors must 
be weighed against each other in each case, and no general and universal answer exists. 
 
 
9. Oil company trade-offs 
 
Closer integration between the two sides would present two seemingly incompatible targets for 
the reward structure. 
 
(a) An incentive structure which creates target compatibility – in other words, a 
compensation system which allows the contractors to share in the gains made jointly. 
That suggests various forms of profit sharing. 
(b) Flexible compensation structures which mean changes can easily be made along the way. 
That normally suggests cost-plus compensation.  
 
When oil and contractor companies work closely together, as with the operation of oil and gas 
fields, it is important to ensure that both sides are pulling in the same direction. Only when target 
compatibility has been achieved can the full benefit of collaboration be secured. This is normally 
down with the aid of incentives. Ideally, these are of a higher order – in other words, they are not 
related only to costs in the specific delivery but also take account of the income side (including 
user flexibility and quality) and life-cycle costs (operating and maintenance costs). The 
incentives will normally relate to specific targets (delivery requirements, productivity, 
milestones) and will be based on a set of assumptions. These usually include a requirement for 
the oil company to provide specified documentation (drilling plans, stratigraphic data and so 
forth) in a given time frame. In other words, the incentive systems assume predictability. 
 
One advantage of close integration between contractor and purchasers is flexibility. This is 
especially important for drilling, particularly in the reservoir. New information from the latter 
will often make it desirable to adjust the original drilling plans in order to achieve optimum 
drainage, and the financial importance of this can far outweigh other considerations – including 
minimising drilling costs. The oil company’s need for control and flexibility conflicts with the goal of incentive systems with predictability. The simplest way of achieving flexibility is various 
forms of cost-plus compensation, such as day rates. If target-based incentive systems are to be 
used, the targets must be adjusted when the oil company changes the original drilling plan. That 
weakens the incentive system because the contractor now knows in advance that good 
opportunities exist for renegotiation. Incomplete contract elements also have the effect that the 
contractor can normally achieve the bonus in any event, since they can usually blame changes by 
the oil company for failing to reach targets. Renegotiation also involves direct transaction costs. 
 
The impression given by incentive contracts in use for oil services is that they are relatively 
simple and unbureaucratic to administer. If changes occur in the basis for calculating the 
applicable benchmarks, these are not adjusted. When a contract has been awarded, it is adhered 
to. However, that may have consequences for future productivity requirements. The benefits of 
complying with the contract without renegotiation are predictability and saving on transaction 
costs, while the draw 
back is that conditions can arise which are perceived as inequitable by one of the sides. However, 
that perception could be less significant if incentives are defined per well section. An overall 
incentive for the whole drilling operation in conditions without renegotiation opportunities, on 
the other hand, could create conditions where the contractor fails to earn the bonus even if a good 
job has been done. 
 
It is difficult to make a scientific assessment of the effect of new incentive elements in oil service 
contracts. Several challenges are faced. First, the contracts used are often relatively complex and 
not directly comparable from project to project. Second, this type of commercial contract is not 
normally open and testable knowledge. Third, the various projects are not directly comparable. 
Cost savings have been reported for drilling service contracts with new contractual forms. See 
Osmundsen et al. (2010). Hydro introduced a performance adjusted price system (Paps) a few 
years ago to provide incentives for oil services. The new elements are that penalties are 
supplemented by rewards for good performance, and that the penalties/rewards are based on well 
sections rather than the complete well. Hydro reported that it was very pleased with the new 
contracts, and estimated that savings were NOK 100 million with NOK 30 million going to the 
contractors. Few change orders have occurred so far and administrative costs are reported to be low. Osmundsen, Roll and Tveterås (2010) study the reasons for variations in drilling speed 
(measured by metres per day) on the NCS over time, and show that the pace fell sharply after 
2004 and then showed a rising trend over the past year. However, not enough contract data was 
available to use this as an explanatory factor, and the authors cannot say whether any of the 
improvement is attributable to the introduction of new incentive elements in oil service contracts 
or rig charters. 
 
New ideas on closer collaboration on the operations side have certain parallels in field 
development, where the Norsok process to cut costs through greater standardisation assigned a 
number of coordination jobs to the supplies industry. Turnkey contractors were established to 
handle coordination of engineering, procurement, construction and installation (EPCI) contracts. 
The actual work had also been outsourced earlier under fabrication contracts, but coordination 
and interfacing between the sub-deliveries remained with the oil companies. A very high level of 
outsourcing also prevails in the drilling sector, estimated at 90 per cent. A full transition to 
running operations from the contractor’s control centre seems to involve a similar type of 
outsourcing for coordination jobs. Instead of buying consultancy services (at hourly rates) for 
each sub-process, where each person is specified, the customer buys a complete operations 
service. 
 
In any event, it will normally be the case that the oil company draws up the drilling programme 
and supervises it but that coordination between the various drilling functions is outsourced. Such 
a solution is the only way all the benefits of decentralisation can be obtained. By serving several 
oil companies from the same location, and operating a number of fields simultaneously, the 
contractor can achieve specialisation, develop expertise and secure economies of scale. More 
flexible staffing will be possible because personnel are not dedicated to specific projects but can 
be allocated to where they are needed at any given time. That reduces dead time. In addition to 
saving costs, a key argument when engineers are in short supply is that competent labour is freed 
up. Scarce berth capacity offshore is also liberated, and savings are made on helicopter transport. 
 
However, this raises a number of key questions. What functions belong to the strategic core of 
the oil companies? The answer varies from company to company. Some want control over drilling interfaces. They regard drilling as one of the primary jobs of an oil company and want to 
exercise full control over the process. Strategic considerations can also play a part. They see that 
service companies are taking over jobs internationally which were previously reserved for the oil 
companies, and regard this as a clear sign that the latter have outsourced too many functions. 
They may also have made big investments in their own operations centres, and it would 
accordingly be constructive not only to seek solutions where all operations occur from the 
contractor’s premises, but also to pursue intermediate solutions where the oil company retains 
coordination of key elements in the drilling process. One example involves contractor personnel 
working during the day at the customer and spending the rest of the time at their own centre. 
Many oil companies want to retain control over elements involved in the drilling process while 
securing access to capacity, and by retaining their own expertise they avoid becoming locked 
into specific contractors – which can weaken bargaining power and technical opportunities in the 
long run. 
 
The degree of outsourcing normally depends on the level of maturity of the supplies market. If 
its liquidity is low, oil companies often dare not make a commitment to outsourcing. 
Competition is insufficient, and they risk getting locked in – in other words, it will subsequently 
be difficult to swap contractor after the contract has finished or the customer finds itself in a 
weak negotiating position over changes to the original terms during the life of the contract. 
Where customers have become locked in, competition over new contracts will  be less efficient if 
the implicit incentives which the contractor has associated with the need to secure new contracts 
are weakened. (When many oil companies are afraid to be locked in, the market does not develop 
either.) The big players on the NCS seek to avoid this problem by having several contractors and 
by periodically changing contractor. However, a balance must be struck here between 
competition and the desire to develop tailored contractor services which will often call for 
specific investment.
3 Other relevant considerations are ownership of information, information 
security and flexibility. These considerations could suggest keeping the activity in-house. The 
cost benefit of outsourcing operational coordination lies partly in the ability of the contractor to 
standardise operations. The drawback of that from the operator companies’ perspective, is that 
                                                 
3 The same need to strike a balance arises in selecting the duration of contracts – short periods ensure strong 
competition but weaken opportunities for tailored solutions. See Osmundsen (1996).  they have fewer opportunities to choose their own systems and analyses. For that reason, it could 
also be difficult to find opportunities to sell in more outsourcing in so far as international oil 
companies want the same system throughout their global business. Should this system then be 
dictated by solutions chosen in Norway? It is therefore perhaps simpler to change specifications 
and training in Norwegian oil companies than in the big international ones. 
 
Possible outsourcing of a number of drilling-related functions to contractors must be 
characterised as a relationship contact. Operation from the contractor’s centre could involve a 
contractual lock-in for the oil company and accordingly requires great trust between the sides. 
Building up such trust takes time. One example cited of a trust-based relationship like this is the 
collaboration between Hydro and Baker over many years. 
 
 
10. Contractor trade-offs 
 
Contractors face corresponding trade-offs when decentralising a number of drilling-related 
functions. Trust is something which must cut both ways. A good deal of investment must be 
made in equipment in order to implement a different division of labour. These are typical 
“specific” investments – in other words, they primarily have value in the specific contractual 
relationship. If this goes wrong, the alternative value of the equipment is low. It accordingly 
represents a risky investment for the contractor, who will be concerned to recoup their 
investment with a relatively high degree of certainty. Experience here is not exclusively positive. 
Important questions include who pays for the equipment and training. Furthermore, it is 
important to predict whether the contractor can retain the cost gains achieved in the longer term 
or whether renegotiations will be required when efficiency has become high (the ratchet effect).  
Or will the gain be competed away in the longer term. Taken together, many factors could 
weaken the contractor’s incentives to invest in new operating facilities. Why should the 
contractor then make a commitment to developing new solutions? Training also becomes more 
expensive with new modes of operation, where employees must have broad expertise – that also 
represents a specific investment for the contractor company. It is easy to lose such personnel. 
 The general impression is that contractors often think industrially. They want good and secure 
margins in growth sectors, with the focus on the long term. They do not wish and are not able to 
accept much risk, and certainly not outside their own sphere of control. They also value projects 
which involve employee training and where the customer helps to boost their expertise. 
 
Experience from the Norsok process, where many contractors ran into financial problems, helps 
to explain the unwillingness of contractors to accept risk. On the other hand, the process could 
not have been implemented without an active contribution from the contractors. The latter now 
refuse to develop new solutions without financial security. A question here is whether 
contractors are to cover the investment in training and new centres, or whether these costs should 
be incorporated in the hourly rates. The challenge with the latter solution is that the margin may 
be competed away in the long term. That creates a chicken-and-egg problem – contractors will 
not invest until they are certain of demand and of recovering their spending, and the operator will 
not use the service until it is available – preferably from several contractors. 
 
11. New companies on the NCS 
 
It may be the case that new modes of operation will arrive with the new companies on the NCS. 
Because they have small organisations, these players will want to outsource more functions to 
contractors and are looking to a greater extent for an overall solution. Small oil companies will 
want a different division of risk vis-a-vis contractors, and will be looking for other kinds of 
contracts – where the contractor bears part of the consequential costs of downtime, for instance, 
or shares in the production and oil price risk. An obstacle here is that contractors lack the ability 
or willingness to accept this type of risk. Their response is that the new companies are unwilling 
to pay for the responsibility they want to transfer. Examples from the UK of such risk transfer to 
the contractor required the renegotiation of the contract because the contractor could not bear the 
risk. It is probably necessary here to learn from the Norsok process, and not include more risk 
than contractors can bear. The latter – with certain exceptions – do not want turnkey contracts 
because they are unwilling to accept reservoir risk. However, that does not exclude intermediate 
forms where greater responsibility – if not all – is transferred to the supplier. With the entry of 
many small companies to the NCS, innovative thinking is needed about contracts and the division of labour. However, financial difficulties for a number of the small oil companies will 
slow down the process of changing modes of working in the short term, since this normally calls 





A socio-economic concern is underinvestment arising because companies fail to internalise 
positive external effects. Contract theory has shown that similar forms of sub-optimisation can 
also occur internally in companies or in contractual relations between two companies. 
Asymmetrical information and lack of opportunities to enforce contracts, for instance, could 
undermine activities which would be economically profitable. This article provides a number of 
examples of this from the oil sector. It also questions whether the management models used by 
the oil industry take adequate account of the companies’ corporate economics. A balance must 
be struck here between taking care of the overall picture and establishing efficient and 
decentralised management models. 
To achieve efficient company management, individual activities must be split up and 
operationalised – as individual projects, for instance. These are then managed and evaluated 
against specific project-defined targets – KPIs. The advantage of this type of division is that each 
department and project knows what it has to do and what it will be measured by. The challenge 
is always to find good KPIs. Clearly measureable criteria such as volume, production cost and 
time could clash with quality, lifetime costs and flexibility. Taking account of these additional 
dimensions is important. In addition comes a clear threat of sub-optimisation. Since the 
measurement system normally only picks up benefits and costs for the individual project, people 
at the project level will not necessarily take account of costs incurred in other departments or at 
other times (involving maintenance, upgrading and removal, for example). Nor will they 
internalise benefits incurred by other departments or projects.  It is important to monitoring this 
type of erroneous disposition and adjust the KPIs so that the best possible account is taken of the 
overall picture. At the same time, excessively complex management structures must be avoided 
and management efficiency maintained. Difficult trade-offs are involved here. One possible solution is for certain functions with great collective value – such as research and development – 
to be handled or at any rate coordinated centrally in the company. 
  Incentives for technology development could be too weak within the framework of 
existing contracts, and institutional and practical considerations also make it difficult to reward 
technological advances through the guaranteed award of new contracts. Another relevant 
challenge – which is not discussed in this article – is the growing demand for transparency and 
auditability when awarding contracts. These are sound principles. But it is also necessary to be 
aware that they could prompt decision-takers to hesitate to select contractors with superior 
technology because that can be difficult to verify in a tendering process. The safest course for the 
bid evaluator could be to select known alternatives at a low price. Assume that a contractor can 
deliver a service which enhances the recovery factor of the reservoir on an expectancy basis, but 
with somewhat greater variance. The buyer who supports this delivery in relation to known and 
secure alternatives must in the event produce an objective justification for this. They then stick 
their neck out, and it is uncertain whether prevailing reward and promotion systems incentivise 
that. If the person concerned is a platform manager, for instance, they have strong incentives to 
maintain the prevailing production plan but perhaps insufficient incentives to increase volume 
beyond that. A number of increased recovery measures also have a certain effective life, and the 
sitting platform manager then bears the risk of downtime or reduced production while their 
successor reaps the rewards of increased production. This kind of sub-optimal incentive does not 
advance the industry. Could the measurability problems associated with technological quality 
lead to price becoming the most important criterion? Do tender criteria pick up improvements in 
technology and organisation? It is important here that the companies make conscious choices in 
these circumstances, that they set evaluation criteria for quality which are clear and as 
predictable as possible ahead of tendering processes, and that KPIs for procurement personnel 
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